PMLA Section 8 Retention and Persons Not Named as Accused: Supreme Court Clarifies the Governing Test

The Supreme Court has clarified that an order confirming attachment, retention or freezing under Section 8(3) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 does not cease merely because the person affected by that order is not named as an accused in the prosecution complaint. The statutory question is whether proceedings relating to an offence under the PMLA are pending before a court, not whether every person whose property or records are affected has been arrayed as an accused.

The ruling was delivered on 5 March 2025 in Union of India v. J.P. Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 1102 of 2025, arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 5706 of 2023. Justices Abhay S. Oka and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh set aside the Gujarat High Court judgment dated 16 February 2022 and the Appellate Tribunal order dated 25 April 2019. The Adjudicating Authority's order dated 4 April 2018 was restored, with the clarification that it would remain in force until disposal of the prosecution complaint.

Why the decision matters

PMLA proceedings may affect property or records held by a person who is not ultimately named as an accused in the prosecution complaint. The judgment addresses whether that omission alone terminates a confirmation order under Section 8(3). The Court answered that question in the negative, but it did so by interpreting the precise statutory text applicable on the date of the Adjudicating Authority's order.

That temporal qualification is important. Section 8 has been amended more than once. The Court expressly confined the governing analysis to the version of Section 8(3) in force from 14 May 2015 through 18 April 2018, while also explaining why the result would not have changed under the immediately succeeding version considered by the lower fora.

Factual and procedural background

According to paragraph 4 of the Supreme Court's order, the Enforcement Directorate registered an Enforcement Case Information Report on 17 March 2017 against J.P. Singh and others. During a search conducted on 13 October 2017, the Directorate seized electronic items, documents and cash.

A prosecution complaint under Section 44 PMLA was filed before the Special Court on 8 February 2018. The Special Court took cognizance on 19 February 2018. Thereafter, on 4 April 2018, the Adjudicating Authority made an order under Section 8(3), confirming the earlier action under Section 17(4).

J.P. Singh challenged the confirmation order before the Appellate Tribunal. On 25 April 2019, the Tribunal concluded that the confirmed order would cease after ninety days. The Gujarat High Court affirmed that view on 16 February 2022 in First Appeal No. 3179 of 2021. The Union of India then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The narrow legal question

The respondent's essential submission was that he had not been made an accused in the prosecution complaint under Section 44. He also contended that the seized material had been retained for an inordinately long period and had not been relied upon or used in the complaint.

The Union argued that the Section 8(3) text applicable on 4 April 2018 contained no ninety-day limit. Under that version, a confirmed attachment, retention or freezing continued during the pendency of proceedings relating to an offence under the PMLA before a court. It further argued that even the amendment effective from 19 April 2018 did not impose an absolute ninety-day terminal point where court proceedings were pending.

The Supreme Court therefore framed a limited issue: for how long would an order of attachment, retention or freezing made by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(3) continue to operate?

The statutory version applied by the Court

Paragraphs 8 and 9 reproduce and apply Section 8(3) as it stood between 14 May 2015 and 18 April 2018. Under clause (a), the confirmed action continued during the pendency of proceedings relating to an offence under the PMLA before a court, or corresponding foreign proceedings before a competent criminal court.

The date of the confirmation order controlled the statutory inquiry. Because the Adjudicating Authority acted on 4 April 2018, the amendment that took effect on 19 April 2018 did not govern that order. The Court consequently rejected the lower fora's reliance on the later text to impose a ninety-day endpoint.

Pending proceedings relate to the offence, not to the status of the property-holder

The central reasoning appears in paragraph 10. When the Section 8(3) order was made, the Section 44 complaint was already pending before the Special Court, and cognizance had been taken of the alleged offence under Section 3 PMLA. The Court held that, for clause (a), the pendency of a complaint alleging the commission of an offence under Section 3 was sufficient.

The person affected by the Section 8(3) order did not also have to be named as an accused in that complaint. The Court explained that a Section 44 complaint relates to an offence under Section 3, punishable under Section 4, and that cognizance is taken of the offence rather than of an accused or offender.

This distinction prevents the duration of a valid confirmation order from turning solely on the array of parties in the prosecution complaint. The statutory link is between the confirmed action and pending proceedings relating to the PMLA offence. It is not a requirement, under the version interpreted, that every affected holder must personally face prosecution.

Why the ninety-day reasoning failed

The Appellate Tribunal and High Court had relied on the amended Section 8(3)(a), effective from 19 April 2018. That text referred to continuation during investigation for a period not exceeding ninety days or during the pendency of proceedings relating to an offence under the Act before a court.

The Supreme Court gave two reasons why this did not support cessation. First, the amended language was not applicable when the confirmation order was passed on 4 April 2018. Second, even if the amended clause were assumed to apply, the ninety-day expression governed the investigation limb; it did not erase the alternative basis of continued operation while the prosecution complaint remained pending. Paragraph 13 records that the order would therefore continue even after ninety days because the complaint was pending.

The operative result

In paragraph 14, the Supreme Court quashed the Gujarat High Court judgment dated 16 February 2022 and the Appellate Tribunal order dated 25 April 2019. It restored the Adjudicating Authority's order dated 4 April 2018 and clarified that the order would continue until disposal of the complaint.

The result is specific. The Court did not decide that every PMLA seizure or retention automatically continues without limit. It decided the duration of a confirmation order under the statutory version applicable to the facts, where a Section 44 complaint relating to the Section 3 offence was pending.

Access to copies of retained records

The order also preserves an important practical safeguard. The respondent invoked Section 21(2), which entitles the person from whom records have been seized or frozen to obtain copies. In paragraphs 15 and 16, the Court directed the Union of India to comply with Section 21(2) within three weeks after a formal application by the respondent.

Retention of original records and access to their contents are therefore distinct questions. Even where continued retention is legally sustained, the statutory right to obtain copies remains enforceable. A person seeking copies should make a clear formal application identifying the records and relying on Section 21(2).

Practical implications

For affected persons, the judgment means that absence from the array of accused is not, by itself, enough to defeat a Section 8(3) confirmation order. A challenge must engage with the applicable statutory version, the validity and scope of the confirmation, the existence and pendency of court proceedings relating to the PMLA offence, and any independent entitlement to release or copies.

For the Enforcement Directorate, the ruling is not a substitute for statutory compliance. Search, seizure, freezing, retention and confirmation remain separate statutory stages with their own recorded-reason, time and adjudicatory requirements. The decision answers the narrow duration question after an order had been confirmed; it does not dispense with the prerequisites for obtaining that order.

For Adjudicating Authorities and appellate courts, the case underlines the need to identify the exact text in force on the material date. Applying a later amendment retrospectively without statutory authority can change both the structure and the result of the inquiry.

For practitioners, four dates should be placed at the centre of the analysis: the search or freezing, the application under Section 17(4), the Section 8(3) confirmation order, and the filing and pendency of the Section 44 complaint. The identity of the statutory version cannot safely be inferred from the date of an appellate decision.

Relationship with the new criminal codes

The ruling turns on the PMLA's special statutory scheme and not on a renumbered provision of the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure or Indian Evidence Act. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 therefore do not supply a substitute section for the PMLA provisions analysed here. Section 3, Section 4, Section 8, Section 17, Section 21 and Section 44 remain references to the PMLA itself.

Conclusion

Union of India v. J.P. Singh clarifies that Section 8(3) attaches legal significance to pending proceedings concerning the PMLA offence, not merely to whether the holder of seized property or records is named as an accused. On the facts, the pending Section 44 complaint sustained the confirmed order until disposal of that complaint. At the same time, the Court enforced the affected person's right under Section 21(2) to obtain copies of retained records.

The judgment should be applied with its temporal and procedural limits intact. The relevant statutory version, the terms of the confirmation order, and the actual status of the prosecution proceedings must be examined in every case.

This article provides general legal information and does not constitute legal advice. The result in any matter depends on its facts, the applicable version of the statute and subsequent legal developments.

Sources

Supreme Court of India, Union of India v. J.P. Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 1102 of 2025, order dated 5 March 2025, paragraphs 4–17: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/30967/30967_2022_4_8_60006_Order_05-Mar-2025.pdf

The Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, Sections 3, 4, 8, 17, 21 and 44: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/indiacode/handle/123456789/2036?view_type=browse

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