When the Victim Settles but the Informant Objects: Supreme Court Clarifies the Law on Quashing Criminal Proceedings

The Supreme Court has drawn an important line between the person who reports an alleged crime and the person who actually suffers the alleged loss or injury. In Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 2026 INSC 928, decided on 31 August 2026, a Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli held that the objection of an informant who is not the real victim does not, by itself, prevent a High Court from quashing criminal proceedings on the basis of a lawful settlement between the accused and the actual victim.

The decision does not create a general right to terminate every criminal case by agreement. Its significance is more precise. It identifies whose settlement matters, preserves the distinction between statutory compounding and inherent quashing, and reiterates that settlement-based quashing remains unavailable for heinous offences and crimes with a serious public dimension.

Background of the dispute

The litigation arose from a private complaint filed in Bhopal in October 2011. The complaint alleged that the accused had used a forged General Power of Attorney and a partnership deed to bring approximately 54.48 acres of land belonging to Pradeep Singh Mehta into M/s Paradise Farms and secure mutation in the firm’s name. The informant, Subhash Chandra Lalwani, also claimed an interest in 7.50 acres forming part of the larger holding.

In May 2012, the Magistrate took cognisance of alleged offences under Sections 466, 467, 468, 471, 420, 406 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The matter ultimately became Sessions Trial No. 459 of 2018. An earlier attempt to quash the proceedings failed before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in April 2018.

The legal position later changed materially because Pradeep Singh Mehta, the landowner whose signature and property formed the foundation of the allegations, filed an affidavit supporting settlement. He stated, among other matters, that the land had been contributed to the partnership, the relevant formalities had been carried out on his instructions, he had no grievance against the accused, and he did not wish to continue with the case. On the High Court’s direction, its Registrar examined the compromise and reported it to be voluntary, genuine and free from threat, inducement or compulsion.

The High Court nevertheless dismissed the second quashing petition on 19 September 2024. It reasoned that the original informant had not joined the settlement and that offences could not be compounded merely on the agreement of the accused and a witness. The Supreme Court found that this approach conflated two legally different powers.

Compounding and inherent quashing are not interchangeable

Compounding is a statutory process. Section 320 CrPC, corresponding to Section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, identifies the offences that may be compounded, the persons entitled to compound them and the cases in which the court’s permission is required. A criminal court exercising the compounding power must remain within that statutory framework.

Quashing on account of settlement is different. Section 482 CrPC, corresponding to Section 528 BNSS, preserves the High Court’s inherent power to give effect to an order under the criminal procedure law, prevent abuse of the process of a court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice. In this jurisdiction the court does not simply treat a non-compoundable offence as compoundable. It asks whether, considering the nature of the dispute, the settlement, the possibility of conviction and the public interest, continuing the prosecution would itself become unjust or abusive.

At paragraphs 28 to 30, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this distinction by applying Naushey Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 78, and the controlling principles in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303. A settlement cannot erase the public character of murder, rape, dacoity, corruption, grave offences of mental depravity, or comparable wrongdoing affecting society. By contrast, proceedings arising overwhelmingly from private, civil, commercial, financial, partnership, matrimonial or family disputes may be quashed in an appropriate case when the victim has genuinely settled and conviction has become remote.

Victim and informant perform different legal roles

The central contribution of the judgment lies in paragraphs 31 to 36. Relying on Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321, the Court explained that a victim and an informant are not necessarily the same person. An informant sets the criminal process in motion by conveying information or lodging a complaint. A victim is the person who suffered the loss or injury caused by the act or omission attributed to the accused.

This distinction is reflected in Section 2(wa) CrPC and the present definition in Section 2(y) BNSS. It is also consistent with Section 39 CrPC, corresponding to Section 33 BNSS, which recognises that a person who becomes aware of specified serious offences may have a duty to inform the authorities even though that person suffered no personal injury.

The Court therefore held that, for settlement-based quashing, it is the real victim who must authorise the settlement. A non-victim informant cannot acquire a veto merely because that person first approached the criminal justice system. Equally, an informant cannot purport to settle away the rights of an actual victim who has not agreed. Paragraph 34 makes both sides of the principle clear: the law protects the victim’s agency rather than the informant’s procedural position.

Why the landowner was treated as the real victim

The Court examined the complaint rather than relying only on the labels used by the parties. The foundation of the prosecution was that Pradeep Singh Mehta’s signature had been forged, his land had been introduced into a partnership without authority, and mutation had been obtained on that basis. On the complaint’s own theory, he was the person who suffered the alleged loss or injury. The Court accordingly held at paragraph 40 that he was a victim.

His later affidavit was crucial. It did not merely express forgiveness in the abstract. It addressed the underlying partnership, mutation, management of the property and his absence of grievance. Because he was also the prosecution’s central witness, the Court concluded at paragraph 41 that he would no longer support the prosecution, making continued proceedings an abuse of process and a waste of judicial time.

The settlement also fell within the Gian Singh category. The Court described the dispute as personal, with no general repercussions for society, and the alleged offences as having a civil flavour with commercial overtones. On those particular facts, the chances of conviction were considered bleak.

Why the informant could not keep the prosecution alive

The Court separately examined whether Subhash Chandra Lalwani could himself be regarded as a victim because of his asserted interest in 7.50 acres. It noted the earlier High Court finding that no documentary material established his interest in the land. The Supreme Court did not rest its decision solely on that finding. It also tested the informant’s case at its highest.

Even assuming he had received some interest from the landowner, the complaint did not allege that the appellant knew of that arrangement. Once the landowner accepted the partnership and mutation, denied any grievance and supported quashing, the complaint disclosed no sustainable basis for the informant to continue prosecuting the accused. At paragraphs 45 to 48, the Court therefore concluded that continuation of the proceedings at the informant’s instance would be an abuse of process.

The operative result

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order dated 19 September 2024 in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 33770 of 2019, and quashed Sessions Trial No. 459 of 2018 against all arrayed accused. It also held that nothing survived in Criminal Revision No. 2747 of 2019 pending before the High Court.

Current-code orientation

The alleged conduct and the institution of proceedings predated the commencement of the new criminal codes, so the judgment correctly retained the IPC and CrPC provisions governing the case. For present practice, Section 482 CrPC corresponds to Section 528 BNSS; Section 320 CrPC corresponds to Section 359 BNSS; Section 39 CrPC corresponds to Section 33 BNSS; and the definition in Section 2(wa) CrPC is now addressed in Section 2(y) BNSS.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 reorganises the substantive offences relevant to the old allegations: criminal conspiracy is addressed in Section 61, criminal breach of trust in Section 316, cheating in Section 318, forgery across Sections 336 to 338, and use of a forged document or electronic record in Section 340. These are current-law orientation points, not a declaration that every old and new provision is textually identical. The applicable law in an individual proceeding must be determined with the repeal-and-savings provisions, including Section 531 BNSS and Section 358 BNS.

Practical implications

First, a quashing petition based on settlement should identify the actual victim by applying the statutory definition to the alleged injury, not merely by repeating the description used in the FIR or complaint.

Second, the settlement should address the substance of the alleged wrongdoing and be demonstrably voluntary. Verification by a court officer, affidavits of the affected person and a clear account of the resolved dispute may become important evidence of genuineness.

Third, opposition by an informant remains relevant but is not automatically decisive. A court must determine whether that informant independently suffered legally cognisable loss or injury and whether the allegations disclose a case affecting that person.

Fourth, the judgment does not reduce settlement-based quashing to a consent form. Courts must still examine the character and gravity of the offences, their social impact, the likelihood of conviction and whether quashing would secure justice rather than conceal serious crime.

Conclusion

Anand Kumar clarifies that criminal procedure protects the person actually harmed, not merely the person who first reports the alleged offence. Where a genuinely private or commercially flavoured dispute has been lawfully settled with the real victim, the non-consent of a person who is only an informant does not create an independent bar to the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The decision is equally clear about the limits: the court must identify the true victim, test the settlement, examine the nature of the offence and refuse quashing where wider public justice would be compromised.

This article provides general legal information and does not constitute legal advice. Outcomes depend on the governing law and facts of each case.

Sources

Supreme Court of India, Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 2026 INSC 928, Criminal Appeal No. 4110 of 2026, judgment dated 31 August 2026: https://www.sci.gov.in/latest-orders/

Supreme Court of India, Naushey Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2025) 4 SCC 78, judgment dated 11 February 2025: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/9523/9523_2023_3_1501_59431_Judgement_11-Feb-2025.pdf

Supreme Court of India, Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu and Another, (2022) 9 SCC 321, judgment dated 18 April 2022: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/5499/5499_2022_1_302_35135_Judgement_18-Apr-2022.pdf

India Code, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/20099?view_type=browse

India Code, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/20062/1/a2023-45.pdf

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