Written Grounds of Arrest under PMLA: The Law after Pankaj Bansal, Ram Kishor Arora and Mihir Rajesh Shah
Written Grounds of Arrest under PMLA: The Law after Pankaj Bansal, Ram Kishor Arora and Mihir Rajesh Shah
An arrest under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 is not valid merely because the Enforcement Directorate possesses incriminating material. Section 19 creates a structured power: an authorised officer must possess relevant material, form and record in writing a reason to believe that the person is guilty of money laundering, and inform that person of the grounds of arrest. Article 22(1) independently guarantees that no arrested person may be detained without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of arrest or denied a lawyer of choice.
The Supreme Court has progressively converted these words into an enforceable arrest protocol. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary sustained Section 19 because of its safeguards. V. Senthil Balaji made remand scrutiny indispensable. Pankaj Bansal required written grounds as a matter of course. Ram Kishor Arora dealt with timing and a pre-Pankaj arrest. Prabir Purkayastha constitutionalised the written-grounds rule. Arvind Kejriwal distinguished the internal reasons to believe from the grounds supplied to the arrestee. Vihaan Kumar reaffirmed Article 22. Mihir Rajesh Shah has now declared that written grounds, in a language understood by the arrested person, are mandatory under every statute and fixed a minimum interval before remand where immediate written delivery is genuinely impracticable.
Three distinct components of a lawful Section 19 arrest
Section 19 involves three concepts that must not be conflated.
First is the material in the officer's possession. It must exist before arrest and rationally support the statutory conclusion.
Second are the reasons to believe. These are the authorised officer's written reasons for drawing that conclusion from the material. They form an institutional record against which a court can test relevance, application of mind and lawful purpose.
Third are the grounds of arrest communicated to the person. They must explain, with sufficient person-specific detail, the alleged role, conduct, transactions or connection with proceeds of crime that caused the power to be exercised against that individual.
Stock expressions such as custodial interrogation, possible destruction of evidence, flight risk or non-cooperation do not by themselves explain the factual case against a particular person. Grounds need not reproduce the complete investigation file, and legitimately sensitive information may be redacted. What remains must nevertheless permit the person to understand and challenge the arrest.
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary: Section 19 survives because it contains safeguards
In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1, decided on 27 July 2022, the three-Judge Bench upheld the PMLA arrest framework. The judgment relied upon the officer's rank, possession of material, written recording of reasons to believe, communication of grounds, forwarding of the arrest record under Section 19(2), production before court and judicial scrutiny as protections against arbitrary action.
Vijay Madanlal did not decide that an oral recital is invariably sufficient. Later judgments prescribe how the safeguards must operate. It supplies the foundation; it does not dilute the written requirement.
V. Senthil Balaji: breach vitiates arrest and remand requires scrutiny
V. Senthil Balaji v. State represented by Deputy Director, 2023 INSC 677, decided on 7 August 2023, confirms that Section 19 is mandatory. Paragraphs 39 and 40 state that failure to comply with Section 19(1) vitiates the arrest. The remand court must examine whether the officer possessed material, recorded the statutory belief and observed the safeguards. A remand order cannot automatically legitimise an arrest lacking statutory foundation.
Pankaj Bansal: the written-grounds rule
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 866, decided on 3 October 2023, arose from inconsistent ED practices: oral reading, temporary inspection followed by a signature, and delivery of a copy.
Paragraphs 35 to 40 connect the right to know the grounds with the stringent bail conditions in Section 45. A person cannot meaningfully show reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty without knowing the case he must answer. Paragraphs 42 and 43 explain that complex allegations cannot reliably be retained at the moment liberty is taken and that oral communication invites factual disputes.
The Court directed that a written copy be furnished as a matter of course and without exception. Sensitive parts may be redacted where disclosure would prejudice investigation, but sufficient grounds must still be given to exercise legal remedies. The arrests before the Court were declared illegal.
Pankaj Bansal also rejected arrest as a response to mere non-cooperation. Evasiveness may be assessed with incriminating material, but refusal to confess or answer as desired cannot become an independent power to arrest.
Ram Kishor Arora: timing and the arrest date
Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 INSC 1082, decided on 15 December 2023, concerned an arrest on 27 June 2023, before Pankaj Bansal. The appellant had read and endorsed the grounds, ED retained the document, and a remand application containing them was supplied within twenty-four hours.
Paragraphs 18 to 22 interpreted "as soon as may be" as the earliest possible stage without avoidable delay, allowing the reasonably requisite time demanded by circumstances. Using production within twenty-four hours as the outer procedural setting, the Court held that oral information at arrest followed by written communication within twenty-four hours satisfied the requirement on those facts.
Paragraph 23 treated "henceforth" in Pankaj Bansal as prospective. Since Arora's arrest preceded that ruling and he had read and acknowledged the grounds, the appeal was dismissed.
The holding must remain within that context. It did not permit ED to revert to oral grounds after 3 October 2023 or routinely wait until the twenty-fourth hour. Later constitutional decisions require communication early enough for legal advice and effective opposition to remand. Mihir Rajesh Shah now supplies a specific rule for genuine practical exceptions.
Prabir Purkayastha: a constitutional, not departmental, protection
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 INSC 414, decided on 15 May 2024, concerned UAPA, whose arrest provision was treated as materially comparable for Article 22.
Paragraphs 28 and 29 call written communication under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) sacrosanct. At paragraphs 45 to 50, the Court applied Pankaj Bansal to proceedings after its pronouncement, distinguished person-specific grounds from general reasons for arrest, and invalidated the arrest and remand. A remand application supplied after remand could not retrospectively fulfil the constitutional function.
Written grounds are therefore not an administrative preference. They enable effective knowledge, legal consultation, opposition to custody and an informed bail application.
Arvind Kejriwal: grounds do not immunise the reasons to believe
Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 INSC 512, decided on 12 July 2024, makes clear that grounds served on the accused and the officer's reasons to believe are related but not interchangeable.
Review is not confined to checking whether a document titled grounds of arrest was delivered. A court can examine whether relevant material existed, whether it was considered, whether the inference was rationally open and whether significant exculpatory material was ignored. The Court referred broader questions concerning the need and necessity to arrest to a larger Bench, while holding that the statutory conditions were met on the record before it and granting interim release in the stated circumstances.
A perfectly served document cannot cure absent or post-facto reasons to believe. Equally, a strong internal file cannot cure failure to communicate intelligible grounds.
Vihaan Kumar: meaningful communication
Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 162, decided on 7 February 2025, arose under Section 50 CrPC, now substantially Section 47 BNSS. Paragraphs 10 to 12 reaffirm that informing an arrested person of the grounds is mandatory. The mode must achieve the purpose of Article 22(1); a later assertion of oral communication cannot displace the need for reliable, contemporaneous compliance.
Mihir Rajesh Shah: written grounds in every case and the two-hour safeguard
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1288, decided on 6 November 2025, resolves the general question. The appeals arose under ordinary criminal law and asked whether written grounds were mandatory in every arrest and what follows where immediate delivery is genuinely impossible.
At paragraphs 41 to 46, after considering Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, Vihaan Kumar and the preventive-detention authorities Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, the Court held that grounds must be communicated in every case, without exception, in writing and in a language understood by the arrested person. Communication means effective knowledge. An English document supplied to someone unable to understand English, accompanied merely by an oral translation, does not necessarily suffice.
Paragraphs 48 to 56 deal with exigency. Article 22(1) does not require a prepared document before physical arrest in every spontaneous situation. If an offence occurs in an officer's presence or an imminent risk makes immediate preparation genuinely impossible, grounds may initially be conveyed orally. Written grounds must then be supplied within a reasonable time and, in every case, at least two hours before production for remand. Failure renders arrest and subsequent remand illegal and entitles the person to be set at liberty.
For a planned PMLA arrest, this exception will ordinarily have little room. Section 19 already requires pre-existing material and written reasons before arrest. ED can generally prepare person-specific grounds from that record.
Punjab and Haryana High Court: written delivery and actual custody
In Roop Bansal v. Union of India, CWP-23005-2023, 2023:PHHC:138899-DB, decided on 31 October 2023, grounds had been read and signed by the petitioner and witnesses, but no copy was furnished. Paragraphs 25 to 31 held that reading and signatures did not satisfy Section 19 and Article 22(1). The Division Bench rejected prospectivity, set aside arrest and remand, and ordered release. Paragraph 32 emphasised the remand court's independent duty.
Pranav Gupta v. Union of India, CWP-24787-2023 with CWP-25048-2023, 2023:PHHC:157511-DB, decided on 7 December 2023, addressed the boundary between questioning and arrest. The petitioners accompanied ED officials on 27 October, while formal arrest papers were made on 28 October. The Court treated the earlier restraint as custody and held that postponing paperwork does not postpone constitutional safeguards.
Dilbag Singh alias Dilbag Sandhu v. Union of India, CRM-M-2191-2024 with CRM-M-3385-2024, 2024:PHHC:017817, decided on 8 February 2024, involved searches beginning on 4 January and formal arrests on 8 January. The Court examined actual restraint, production within twenty-four hours, both limbs of Section 19 and remand scrutiny, held the detention and arrests unlawful, and ordered release. The judgment does not obstruct a lawful continuing search; it prevents search power becoming days of undisclosed custody.
These cases establish that the State cannot choose an artificial arrest time after effective custody has begun. Article 22 duties attach to the substance of restraint.
Delhi High Court: specific grounds contrasted with a generic memo
Manideep Mago v. Union of India and Sanjay Sethi v. Union of India, W.P.(CRL.) 2241/2024 and 2391/2024, 2025:DHC:3739, decided on 15 May 2025, considered related ED and police arrests.
Paragraphs 40 and 41 found that ED's written grounds contained allegations specific to each petitioner and conveyed the essential case; non-cooperation was only one consideration. Section 19(2) was also sufficiently complied with. The PMLA arrests were upheld.
The parallel police arrest memos failed. Paragraphs 46 to 49 held that custodial interrogation, possible evidence destruction, witness influence and flight risk were only general reasons. They did not identify the petitioners' roles or particular incriminating circumstances. The police arrests were quashed under Prabir Purkayastha.
Compliance therefore turns on substance, not the document's label.
Language, timing and acknowledgment
After Mihir Rajesh Shah, a signed acknowledgment is evidence of delivery but not conclusive proof of effective communication. A court should examine the language, the person's ability to understand it, whether an accurate translated copy was supplied, the time available to read it and whether access to counsel was real.
The current rule is:
1. In a planned Section 19 arrest, person-specific written grounds should be furnished at arrest or immediately thereafter.
2. Oral communication alone is not final compliance.
3. Only genuine practical exigency can justify initial oral communication.
4. Even then, written grounds must be furnished within a reasonable time and at least two hours before remand.
5. Ram Kishor Arora's twenty-four-hour reasoning cannot be used to deprive a person of adequate time to consult counsel and oppose remand in a planned, post-Pankaj arrest.
6. If actual restraint began before the formal memo, time runs from the real commencement of custody.
Consequences and the remand court's duty
Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha and Mihir Rajesh Shah establish that non-compliance renders arrest and consequent remand illegal. A later remand application cannot retrospectively validate custody.
Release does not necessarily terminate investigation, quash the ECIR or confer immunity from a future lawful arrest. Mihir Rajesh Shah contemplates that, after release, an agency may seek custody supported by reasons and necessity after supplying grounds and explaining the default. The court must decide according to law and natural justice.
Before authorising custody, the Special Court should determine whether the officer was authorised; material and written reasons existed before arrest; the grounds were person-specific; actual restraint began when claimed; written grounds were supplied in a language understood and at the correct time; counsel was meaningfully accessible; Section 19(2) was followed; and production occurred within twenty-four hours. This is not a mini-trial. It is scrutiny of the jurisdictional and constitutional conditions for taking liberty.
Conclusion
The present law is clear. Section 19 requires pre-existing material and recorded reasons to believe. The arrested person must receive intelligible, person-specific grounds in writing and in a language understood, early enough to secure legal advice and resist remand. The Special Court must independently audit compliance.
Ram Kishor Arora remains relevant to its pre-Pankaj facts and the expression "as soon as may be", but it is not an enduring oral-communication exception. Pankaj Bansal established the PMLA requirement, Prabir Purkayastha grounded it in Article 22(1), Arvind Kejriwal preserved review of the underlying reasons, and Mihir Rajesh Shah now provides the controlling language and two-hour-before-remand rules.
Liberty cannot be taken on undisclosed or formulaic grounds. The State must justify the arrest to a court, and the arrested person must be able to understand and contest that justification before custody is extended.
This article provides general legal information and does not constitute legal advice. The remedy depends on the arrest date, statute, record and procedural stage of each case.
Sources
Supreme Court of India, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1, 27 July 2022: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/20982/20982_2018_1_1501_37292_Judgement_27-Jul-2022.pdf
Supreme Court of India, V. Senthil Balaji v. State represented by Deputy Director, 2023 INSC 677, 7 August 2023: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/28176/28176_2023_7_1501_45841_Judgement_07-Aug-2023.pdf
Supreme Court of India, Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 866, 3 October 2023: https://webapi.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/30275/30275_2023_16_1501_47281_Judgement_03-Oct-2023.pdf
Supreme Court of India, Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 INSC 1082, 15 December 2023: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/40323/40323_2023_15_1501_49103_Judgement_15-Dec-2023.pdf
Supreme Court of India, Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 INSC 414, 15 May 2024: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/42896/42896_2023_3_1503_53250_Judgement_15-May-2024.pdf
Supreme Court of India, Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 INSC 512, 12 July 2024: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2024/16350/16350_2024_2_1501_53587_Judgement_12-Jul-2024.pdf
Supreme Court of India, Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 162, 7 February 2025: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2024/43293/43293_2024_4_1501_59316_Judgement_07-Feb-2025.pdf
Supreme Court of India, Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1288, 6 November 2025: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2024/56321/56321_2024_9_1502_65444_Judgement_06-Nov-2025.pdf
Punjab and Haryana High Court, Roop Bansal v. Union of India, 2023:PHHC:138899-DB, 31 October 2023: https://livedb9010.phhc.gov.in/public/judgments/order-pdf?case_type=CWP&case_no=23005&case_year=2023&order_date=2023-10-31&order_type=FINAL
Punjab and Haryana High Court, Pranav Gupta v. Union of India, 2023:PHHC:157511-DB, 7 December 2023: https://livedb9010.phhc.gov.in/public/judgments/order-pdf?case_type=CWP&case_no=24787&case_year=2023&order_date=2023-12-07&order_type=FINAL
Punjab and Haryana High Court, Dilbag Singh alias Dilbag Sandhu v. Union of India, 2024:PHHC:017817, 8 February 2024: https://livedb9010.phhc.gov.in/public/judgments/order-pdf?case_type=CRM-M&case_no=2191&case_year=2024&order_date=2024-02-08&order_type=FINAL
Delhi High Court, Manideep Mago v. Union of India and Sanjay Sethi v. Union of India, 2025:DHC:3739, 15 May 2025: https://delhihighcourt.nic.in/app/showFileJudgment/AJB15052025CRLW22412024_150756.pdf
India Code, Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, Sections 19 and 45: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/15402
India Code, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Sections 47, 48 and 531: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/20099
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