Digital Free Speech After Shreya Singhal: The Constitutional Rules for Online Content
The internet changes the speed and reach of expression, but it does not create a lesser constitutional right. Article 19(1)(a) protects speech online, while Article 19(2) permits only the specified reasonable restrictions. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, remains the central authority on vague online-speech offences and intermediary takedowns.
Why Section 66A failed
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 criminalised broadly described online messages using expressions such as “grossly offensive” and “menacing”. The Supreme Court struck it down in its entirety. The provision was vague, swept far beyond the grounds in Article 19(2), and produced a chilling effect because ordinary people could not reliably know what conduct was prohibited.
The Court distinguished discussion, advocacy and incitement. Even unpopular or disturbing discussion and advocacy remain protected unless they reach a constitutionally recognised basis for restriction. A criminal prohibition cannot be sustained merely because speech causes annoyance or inconvenience when those concepts are not grounds under Article 19(2).
Blocking and procedural safeguards
The Court upheld Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules because the power is tied to specified grounds and contains procedural safeguards. This did not create an unrestricted executive power. A blocking direction must remain within the statute, identify a lawful ground and comply with the prescribed process. Judicial review remains available.
Intermediary liability
Section 79 gives qualifying intermediaries conditional protection for third-party content. Shreya Singhal read the “actual knowledge” requirement narrowly: the intermediary’s duty to remove unlawful material is triggered by a court order or an appropriate government notification conforming to Article 19(2), rather than by every private allegation.
This approach avoids forcing platforms to decide contested legality under threat of liability. Automatic removal on untested complaints can suppress lawful speech and transfer censorship decisions to private actors without due process.
Internet restrictions and publication
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, confirmed that freedom of speech and the freedom to practise a profession through the internet receive constitutional protection. Restriction orders must be published, open to challenge, proportionate and temporary rather than indefinite. The Court did not declare a freestanding fundamental right to internet access; it protected the exercise of established freedoms through that medium.
Current analysis must separate different legal questions: criminal liability for the speaker, blocking under Section 69A, intermediary safe harbour under Section 79, and restrictions on network access. Each has a distinct source of power and set of safeguards.
Conclusion
Digital regulation can address incitement, security threats and other harms recognised by law. Shreya Singhal nevertheless requires precision: vague offences, undisclosed commands and indiscriminate takedowns are incompatible with a constitutional system in which restrictions must be justified under Article 19(2).
Sources
Supreme Court of India, Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015 INSC 257, [2015] 5 SCR 963: https://api.sci.gov.in/officereport/2025/7547/7547_2025_2025-03-03_355.html
Supreme Court of India, Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020 INSC 31, [2020] 1 SCR 812: https://api.sci.gov.in/officereport/2025/7547/7547_2025_2025-03-03_355.html
Information Technology Act, 2000: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1999?locale=en
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